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This paper investigates the motives behind internal income transfers through an analysis 
of original survey data. Though there has been much research on this topic, few studies have 
addressed the role of seasonal migration and factors specifically relevant to women (such as 
number of children) in remittance behavior. Both issues are investigated here.  Over 100 female 
migrant domestic workers living in Dakar, Senegal were given a survey on their remittance 
behaviors, work, and family situations.   The correlations between percent of income remitted 
and explanatory variables such as age, number of children, and status as a seasonal migrant, was 
used to determine the characteristics of migrants who remit the most.  This information was then 
used to draw conclusions on migrants’ motives for remitting.  Three main results were 
established. First, status as a seasonal migrant is associated with a higher percent of income 
remitted relative to non-seasonal migrants, suggesting that seasonal migrants have a greater stake 
in their home community due to regular stays at home.  This also reflects the idea that families 
use rural-urban migration as a tool for household consumption smoothing. Secondly, having a 
small number of children is associated with a higher percent of income remitted relative to those 
with many or no children, indicating that the women with one or two young children leave them 
in care of their grandparents, and that remittances are a form of payment for the child’s needs. 
Finally, migrants with a deceased father remit less than those with a living father, which supports 
an insurance motive.   
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
International remittances are often discussed in the media due to their profound impact on 
sending and especially recipient countries.  However, internal remittances play a similarly 
important role in the economies of developing countries, particularly in relation to the dynamic 
between urban centers and rural regions. Many of the poorest inhabitants of developing countries 
rely on remittances from cities to stabilize income from farming, which may be volatile due to 
natural harvest cycles, as well as unexpected drought or pest issues. On the other end, young and 
often uneducated workers are flooding into cities, contributing to overcrowding and testing the 
limits of underdeveloped infrastructure.  They have many motivations, the most prominent being 
to help their families and hopefully work toward a more economically prosperous life for 
themselves. Because of the vital role of internal remittances in both rural and urban economies, it 
is critical to understand what motivates these income transfers. Though there have been many 
studies focusing on determinants of remittances, some questions remain. Little research has 
examined how plans for return migration impact the dynamic between migrants and those 
remaining, and none has specifically focused on the effect of seasonal migration on remittance 
behavior. Furthermore, as most migration studies focus on international remittances, there is 
insufficient understanding of how internal migrants leaving their young children in the care of 
their grandparents impacts remittance behavior. 
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Senegal is an ideal site for a study investigating the role of seasonal migration in 
remittances. Its geographical position between the desert to the north and tropical forests to the 
south means that it has a long dry season, lasting from the end of October to June of the 
following year. During this period, a low level of agricultural activity leads to chronic 
underemployment in rural areas, pushing inhabitants to migrate to urban centers in search of 
temporary work (Mbengue 1998). In addition, the large number of young migrant domestic 
workers living in Dakar provides an ideal population for studying the effect of age and number 
of children on remittances.   
Through the collection and analysis of surveys on the remittance behavior of female 
domestic workers living in Dakar, this paper investigates the motivations behind internal income 
transfers. The correlation of percent of income remitted (to the head of household) with the 
domestic worker’s status as a seasonal migrant, among other explanatory variables such as her 
age, number of children, and the death of a parent, is used to determine the characteristics of 
migrants who remit the most.  This information is then used to draw conclusions about a 
migrant’s motivation to remit. Understanding an internal migrant’s incentives for remitting will 
lend important insight to the dynamic between urban and rural regions, which could help to 
inform policy initiatives for rural development.  Furthermore, when migrants are young, 
underprivileged women, understanding their role becomes relevant to other issues such as child 
labor and educational equality for women. 
Estimating the determinants of remittances produced three main results. First, status as a 
seasonal migrant is associated with a statistically significant increase of almost 10% of income 
remitted. This finding would suggest that seasonal migrants have a greater stake in their home 
community due to regular stays at home and reflects the idea that families use rural-urban 
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migration as a tool for household consumption smoothing. Secondly, having a small number of 
children is associated with an increase in percent of income remitted. This result may indicate 
that the women with one or two young children leave them in care of their grandparents, and that 
remittances are a form of payment for childcare services. Finally, migrants with a deceased 
father remit on average around 14.5% less of their monthly income to their remaining head of 
household than those with a living father.  This result is somewhat counterintuitive if we 
presume that migrants are remitting for altruistic reasons. However, though women have a right 
to inherit property by Senegalese law, cultural and religious traditions often dictate otherwise 
(Gaestel 2010).  Thus, the domestic worker’s mother may be less able to support her in the 
future, decreasing her incentives for sending remittances. All of these results were statistically 
significant. 
In order to reach these conclusions, over 100 domestic workers living in Dakar were 
interviewed regarding their work, family, and remitting behaviors. Data was analyzed using a 
standard OLS regression of explanatory variables on percent of income remitted. See the Annex 
on page 30 for a list of questions asked. Most of the workers interviewed were very young, 
uneducated, and made an average of just $140 (PPP) per month, about half of which they send to 
their families who remain in rural areas.  Though their ages ranged from 15 to 50, the median age 
was 21 years old.  About a quarter of the domestic workers interviewed stay in Dakar only 
during the dry season and return home for harvest from July to October.  
In general, literature on remittances supports a theory of “tempered altruism”, a term 
coined by Lucas and Stark in their seminal paper on remittances of internal migrants in 
Botswana. That is, while migrants do exhibit some altruistic tendencies, they also have self- 
serving motives for remitting. Factors such as the sender and recipient’s income, frequency of 
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visits home, and level of education have been studied extensively, often with conflicting results.  
This study both supports and expands upon these findings. The few studies addressing the role of 
temporary or permanent return to origin also find that those who visit often or plan to return 
remit more.  A similar study on domestic workers in Tunisia finds that probability of remitting 
increases with age, with the actual amount decreasing, compared to the concave relationship 
between age and remittances identified here. Only one other paper has found a significant 
relationship between the migrants’ children and remittances; Dustmann and Mestres (2010) note 
a positive relationship between remittances and number of children abroad.   
After a brief review of available literature on remittances in Section 2, I provide relevant 
background information about migration and domestic work in Sections 3 and 4. The following 
section gives an overview of survey procedures and a basic summary of data collected.  After 
explaining methodology in Section 6, results of the statistical analysis are presented in Section 7. 
Section 8 concludes with a discussion of these results. 
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2.0  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A considerable number of studies have already addressed the economic motivation behind 
remittances, particularly those flowing between countries. Much of the evidence has revealed 
conflicting and unclear motives, but certain key pieces provide significant insight into the 
behavior of migrants. See the chart at the end of this section for an overview of findings on 
different indicators (Table 1). One of the primary conclusions is that migrants remit at least 
partially in hopes of receiving an inheritance or future assistance (insurance). Lucas and Stark 
(1985) surveyed internal migrants in Botswana and found that the log of monthly remittances 
was positively correlated with higher recipient family income, suggesting migrants were 
motivated by a potential inheritance, or knowledge that the family could insure the migrant in 
case of hard times. Hoddinott (1994) used evidence from Kenya which also demonstrated a 
positive relationship between recipient landholdings and the percent of income remitted to 
support the argument that migrants were motivated by a potential inheritance or for insurance 
reasons.  
Amuedo and Pozo (2006) take a different approach to looking for evidence which 
supports the insurance motive.  Instead of viewing altruism and insurance as competing motives, 
they view them as two intentions that can coexist and often do.  Thus, they use a factor to 
measure the insurance motive among Mexican immigrants to the United States which is not 
associated with altruism.  They hypothesize that if remittances go down as host country risk 
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factors such as legal status, access to social benefits and networks, work experience, and length 
of residence are decreasing, then migrants remit in order to self-insure.  If migrants face a high 
level of risk, then is a greater chance of return migration and a subsequent need for familial 
support.  Thus, migrants who remit more when risk factors are high are hedging against this 
possibility.  Amuedo and Pozo find that migrants are likely to behave as risk-averse individuals; 
undocumented migrants are both more likely to remit (three percentage points higher) and remit 
a greater portion of their income (five percentage points higher) (Amuedo and Pozo 2006). 
Though this study on domestic workers was not able to examine recipient income or measure 
risk factors, the correlation of decreased remittances with the death of a father suggests that 
migrants may remit for insurance reasons, as a the migrant’s mother or siblings may not have the 
same capacity to provide for her in the future. 
On the other hand, there is also significant evidence for the altruistic behavior of 
migrants. Lucas and Stark (1985) also found that remittances were countercyclical, supporting 
the theory that migrants are concerned about the welfare of their families in addition to their own 
welafare.  Cox, Eser, and Jimanez (1998) found that the probability of remitting among Peruvian 
migrants had in inverse relationship with recipient income, lending further support to the 
altruism argument. In Mali, there was an inverse relationship between the number of migrants in 
the recipient household and the amount remitted.  This suggests that the migrant's decision to 
remit is based on his family's expected welfare, rather than a desire to secure personal benefits, 
which should be unaffected by the remitting behavior of siblings (Gubert 2002).  This same 
result was confirmed in a study of migrants in Guyana, where the probability of remitting was 
significantly negatively related to the number of other migrants in the family (Agarwal 2002).  
Though the results of this paper did not point to any specific characteristics causing variation in 
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remittances that could be used to determine an altruistic motive, there was limited information on 
characteristics of the recipient’s family.  Thus, this study certainly does not disqualify altruistic 
motives. The notion that migrants remit with "tempered altruism", first suggested by Lucas and 
Stark, seems reasonable given the evidence in the literature for both altruistic and inheritance 
seeking motives.   
Exchange and repayment for services is another motive for remitting.  One of Lucas and 
Stark’s (1985) primary findings was that the size of cattle herds among recipient families was 
positively related to the level of remittances, suggesting that remittances were being used as a 
means of exchange for care of livestock. This idea is further supported by evidence from 
Vietnam which shows that the migrant's level of education is positively related to the amount 
remitted, controlling for income (Niimi, Pham and Reilly, 2008). However, Amuedo and Pozo 
(2006) find a negative relationship between education and percent of income remitted, 
suggesting that this good was not necessarily provided by the family of the migrants, and that 
more educated migrants are in a less tenuous position in the host country, leading to lower 
insurance-related remittances. The evidence in this study supports the hypothesis that exchange 
for services is a motive for remitting. Migrants with one or two children remitted more than their 
child-less counterparts, suggesting that their remittances were in part a payment for childcare 
services. 
Concentrating on a similar subject population as this study, a paper by Dostie and 
Vencatachellum (2006) on the remittances of domestic workers in Tunisia focused on the 
differences between determinants of compulsory and voluntary transfers. They found that as the 
domestic worker aged, her probability of being subject to compulsory remittances decreased, 
while the probability that she would choose to remit voluntarily increased.  Conversely, the 
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dollar amount of compulsory remittances was increasing in age (most likely reflecting higher 
incomes), while the amount of voluntary remittances was decreasing in age. In addition, having a 
higher number of younger sisters was correlated with higher compulsory remittances, while 
having more older brothers was related to higher voluntary remittances. It was reasoned that a 
higher number of brothers made it more likely that the family would be able to offer the migrant 
financial support in the future, while more sisters meant a higher level of need for additional 
income from the family. It is worth noting that the phenomenon of contractually mandated 
remittances for young domestic workers is not prevalent in Dakar, as none of the participants in 
this study reported their income being transferred directly from the employers to their families.  
However, findings on the relationship between remittances and age in Dakar lend important 
insight into the discoveries of Dostie and Vencatachellum. Both papers reflect an eventual 
decrease in percent of income remitted as a domestic worker ages. The data on domestic workers 
in Dakar shows an initial increase in percent of income remitted as age increases, while the data 
on domestic workers in Tunisia shows an increase in the probability of remitting.  These findings 
both reflect that there may be conflicting factors at play in our observance of the correlation of 
age and remittances.  Perhaps workers remit more as they become more established in Dakar and 
are more mature in handling their finances, but remit less as they begin to grow distant from 
family in the rural areas. 
Another relevant factor in the motivation for remitting is the role of the migrant’s gender.  
There is evidence to support that females differ from males both in the amount they remit and 
their motivation for doing so. Female Cuban migrants were more likely to remit than their male 
counter parts (Blue 2004). A paper by Vanwey (2004) examining the remittance behavior of 
internal migrants in Thailand split remittance motivations into those of a contractual nature 
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(repayment, inheritance), and those of an altruistic nature. It was discovered that females tend to 
behave in a more altruistic manner by being more likely to remit to families with low incomes 
who send few other migrants.  Another study by de la Brière et al. (2002) showed that the 
amount of remittances from Dominican female migrants to the U.S. were positively correlated 
with the number of annual lost work days due to illness by the recipient family. No such 
response was observed from male migrants. This countercyclical remittance behavior suggests 
altruism as a motive. On the other hand, Merkle and Zimmerman (1991), find that male 
immigrants in West Germany had a higher level of remittances in comparison to female 
migrants. However, the majority of research seems to support the idea that females tend to remit 
more, and for more altruistic reasons. Though this paper does not examine differences in 
remitting behavior between males and females, all subjects are women, so it is important to 
understand how their conduct may differ from that of the average migrant. 
Though there has not been any research investigating the specific connection between 
seasonal migration and remittances, Dustmann and Mestres (2010) look at how temporary 
migration is related to international remittances. They find a significant positive relationship 
between the log of amount remitted and plans to return home based on data collected from 
migrants in Germany, which suggests that migrants sometimes remit as a form of investment or 
savings for their eventual homecoming. These same findings are also reflected in a study on 
internal migrants in Kenya, where it was shown that each additional year away from the home 
community is correlated with decreasing percent of income remitted (Johnson 1974). Data on 
remittances from Cuban immigrants also showed a positive relationship between frequency of 
visits home and the amount remitted (Blue 2004). This illustrates how temporary visits may 
influence the social obligation aspect of remitting. Remitting could act as a tool to retain respect 
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and influence in the home community. My findings concur with those of Blue (2004) and 
Dustman and Mestres (2010).  Seasonal migrants retain strong ties with their home region 
through yearly stays of at least two months, and not surprisingly, this is reflected in the amount 
they remit.  I found that seasonal migrants remit almost 10% more of their monthly income than 
non-seasonal migrants. 
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Table 1: Summary of Literature 
 
Summary of Literature 
Note: + denotes positive relationship with remittances, - denotes negative relationship 
Authors 
 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Lucas 
and 
Stark 
Dostie and 
Vencatach
-ellum 
Agarwal 
and 
Horowitz 
Johnson and 
Whitelaw 
Amuedo 
and Pozo 
Blue Merkle 
& 
Zimmer
man 
Income + +  +    
Home Income +  -    + 
Schooling   + + -   
Female +  +  - + - 
Duration of Absence +, -   - - -  
Age  +   +  + 
Age Squared  -     - 
Household size + +,- + + +  + 
Number of Migrants   -    - 
Return Migration       + 
Children at Home        
 De la 
Brière 
et al 
Cox et al. Dustmann 
and 
Menstres 
Gubert Hoddinott Niimi Vanwey 
Income   +   +  
Home Income  -      
Schooling   -  + + + 
Female        
Duration of Absence +  +,- 
quadratic 
   - 
Age +  +  +  - 
Age Squared -    -  + 
Household size        
Number of Migrants    -   - 
Return Migration   +     
Children at Home   +     
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3.0  INTERNAL MIGRATION IN SENEGAL 
Senegal is an ideal country in which to study remittances due to the prevalence of migration and 
urbanization. While there is significant movement within and into rural areas, migration is most 
notably towards the bustling urban center of Dakar, which received a net influx of 33,343 
internal migrants over the five year period from 2003 to 2008 (République du Sénégal 2009).  
The trend of urbanization in Senegal is nothing new; in 1993 Dakar had an annual growth rate of 
3.8% compared to 2.7% for the rest of Senegal (Mbengue 1998).  In fact, over one third of 
Dakar’s residents were born outside of the city (Cohen et al. 1997).   This population pressure 
has led to a large labor surplus, much of which is pushed into the informal sector.  Though the 
city of Dakar occupies only 0.3% of Senegal's land, it contains around 21% of its population 
(République du Sénégal 2004).   
Migrants relocate for a variety of reasons, but are usually motivated by economic or 
family incentives. Marriage is an especially strong motivation for women; over 33% of all 
female internal migrants relocate for this reason (République du Sénégal 2004).   The fact that 
women are much more likely to relocate for marriage than men is reflected in the ratio of male to 
female migrants at different age ranges.  Internal migration under the age of 25 is dominated by 
women, while migrants over the age of 25 are more likely to be male (Ndiaye 1989).  However, 
this figure also captures the large number of young women who migrate temporarily in order to 
work as domestic workers before getting married.  Women who migrate for economic reasons 
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actually have lower birthrates due to later marriages and separation from their spouses (Cohen et 
al. 1988). 
Continually deteriorating economic and environmental conditions in the rural areas east 
of Dakar also create a strong pull to the city.  Production of cash crops, particularly groundnuts, 
was stressed heavily during the colonial period, taking precedence over food production.  This 
led to a high population density in the groundnut basin: the regions of Diourbel, Kaolack, Fatick, 
and Theis (Ba et al. 1994).   In fact, many inhabitants of the Senegal River basin migrated to this 
area during the colonial period (Hanna 1987).  However, production of groundnuts has fallen off 
since independence as a result of both decreased demand for peanut products and increased 
competition from emerging economies such as China and India (Cohen et al. 1997).  The area 
continues to rely on imports for food, most notably rice. Production is becoming increasingly 
insufficient to support the growing population. Incidence of household poverty in 2002 was 
57.7% in rural areas, compared to 33.3% in Dakar (République du Sénégal 2004).  
Furthermore, environmental causes such as desertification, erosion, and irregular rainfall 
have made it increasingly difficult for farmers to sustain production that is sufficient to support 
the rural population.  For example, the total production of groundnuts was less than half in 2009 
of what is was in 2008, mostly due to insufficient rainfall (République du Sénégal, 2009).  In 
addition, poor agricultural practices such as over-farming have led to decreased soil fertility, 
while production is further limited by poor seed quality and insufficiency of capital goods.   
As a result of these problems, rural households are continually seeking ways to diversify 
their income and cut down on the number of people who need to be supported. Sending certain 
family members into Dakar to find work is often a collective decision for group survival.  
Previous migrants from the same village pave the way for new migrants by helping them to find 
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jobs and places to live.  Consequently, migrants hold strong ties with their regions of origins, 
both through monetary contributions and frequent visits.  Almost 60% of all internal migrants 
remit money to the head of the household remaining in the village, and 85.3% visit at least once 
a year (République du Sénégal, 2004).   Only 3 of the participants in this study didn’t send 
remittances, and 92% of migrants said they visited their rural homes at least once a year. Many 
also have plans to return home after a specified period of time or a significant event such as 
marriage.  
Seasonal migration is also highly prevalent in Senegal due to the long period of 
agricultural inactivity during the dry season, which lasts from mid-September to mid-June of the 
following year.  Having some family members working in the non-agricultural sector helps to 
generate revenue for the household and smooth consumption during this period of economic 
inactivity. The census in 1988 found that over 5% of the Senegalese population is seasonal 
migrants, and furthermore, that woman dominated this figure in the 10-14 age group, as well as 
in the 15-19 age group for the regions of Fatick and Zinguinchor (Cohen et al., 1997).  This 
would suggest that domestic workers, who are almost exclusively female and usually quite 
young, make up a significant portion of seasonal migrants. 
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4.0  DOMESTIC WORK IN DAKAR 
Unlike in most developed countries, the employment of at least one domestic worker, even in 
middle to lower- middle class households, is quite common in Dakar and other regional capitols 
in Senegal.  The high relative cost of utilities and 
household appliances in relation to the 
availability and low cost of human labor 
contribute to this prevalence.  About 24.9% of 
economically active females over the age of 10 in 
Dakar are employed as domestic workers 
(République du Sénégal, 2004).  The majority of 
these workers have migrated from the interior of 
Senegal, particularly the heavily agricultural mid-
western regions closest to Dakar- Thies, Fatick, Diourbel, and Kaolack (see Figure 1).  In fact, 
only 6 of the 102 domestic workers participating in this survey were born in Dakar.   
Domestic workers are hired to provide a variety of services for their employers.  While 
some may perform only specific tasks such as laundry, childcare, or cooking, the majority spends 
the entire day at the home of their employer, doing any and every household chore asked of 
them.  About one third of the domestic workers surveyed also lived in the home of their 
employer, a benefit that on one hand alleviates the cost of rent, but on the other often leads to 
Origin of Domestic Workers 
Figure 1: Distribution of Regions of Origin 
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working late hours. Work arrangements are often informal, with no written contract.  Domestic 
workers usually secure employment though an acquaintance or family member, an employment 
“agency”, or by simply going door-to-door.  
Their employment situation is often tenuous; 
the median tenure of survey respondents was 
just 5 months.  Because of the informality of 
their working situation and lack of awareness 
of their legal rights, domestic workers are 
extremely vulnerable to violence, sexual 
harassment and abuse, false accusations of 
stealing, and failure to be remunerated for their services. Even those who are not victims of 
outright abuse often withstand less than ideal working conditions. Many have only one day off 
every two weeks, and are treated unkindly by their employers. “The people we work for treat us 
like slaves” says Mossane Ndiaye, a domestic worker living in Dakar (Faye 2006). 
 Almost all domestic workers have either no formal education at all, or dropped out 
shortly after completing 
primary school, usually in 
order to migrate and 
begin work.  This 
generalization is reflected 
in the survey data; 69% 
of respondents had never 
been to school, and the rest 
Figure 2: Domestic Workers' Formal Schooling 
Figure 3: Age Distribution of Participants 
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had completed an average of just 5.6 years of schooling (see Figure 2).  The ages of the domestic 
workers also explain why many are uneducated; about 1/3 of respondents were of school age 
(see Figure 3).  Thus, alternative opportunities for employment are severely limited for most 
domestic workers.  However, many take solace in the hope of returning home to marry or have 
children. About 85% of survey respondents reported plans to ultimately return to their village of 
origin.  This also explains why there are so few domestic workers over the age of 30. 
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5.0  COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA 
One hundred and two domestic workers were interviewed in May-June of 2010 in Dakar, 
Senegal.  The survey was implemented in Senegal's national language, Wolof (spoken by all 
respondents) with the assistance of a translator.  Participants were recruited using referral.  The 
investigator began by interviewing the domestic workers of personal acquaintances, and 
continued by being referred to other potential participants by the employers or the domestic 
workers themselves.  Unfortunately, it was not possible to use random sampling techniques 
because domestic work is traditionally informal, and there is no record or registration of 
domestic workers in Dakar.  Additionally, certain employers are hesitant to allow access to their 
domestic workers due to fear of legal or human rights issues.  It is probable that the implemented 
method of participant recruitment led to a bias towards domestic workers from similar 
backgrounds.  However, a similar method was implemented by Dostie and Vencatachellum 
(2002), and the data collected appears consistent with the expected characteristics and 
backgrounds of domestic workers in Senegal, as will be detailed in the following section. 
All survey respondents were women, with ages ranging from 15 to 50 (see Figure 3).  
Workers younger than 15 were not interviewed, as that is the legal age for work in Senegal, 
though only two potential respondents were turned away for this reason.  The distribution of ages 
was heavily skewed to the left: 75% of domestic workers interview were under 24 and the 
median age was 21.  However, the average age when respondents reported beginning work was  
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14.5 years old.  About 35% of respondents were married, but only 32.3% had children (not all of 
those who had children were married), and only 14.7% had children over the age of six.  
The vast majority of survey respondents came from the groundnut basin regions of Thies, 
Fatick, Diourbel, and Kaolack (see Figure 1).  Only six of the domestic workers interviewed 
were born in Dakar.  Somewhat surprisingly, Serere women were about two thirds of the sample 
population, while that ethnic group makes up less than one sixth of the general population (see 
Figures 4 and 5).  This could be due to the fact that migration is often seen as a rite of passage 
for young Serere woman, but may also be a result of the non-random sampling technique.  These 
women did not have any defining characteristics in common besides their ethnicity, so it is 
unlikely that this will impact results.  Almost 27% of the sample had lost their fathers, and only 
68% had both parents still living.  The domestic workers came from families with an average of 
over 6 children, higher than the national fertility rate of 4.8 births per woman (The World Bank).  
If their families were working, they were usually farmers, and almost a quarter of the domestic 
workers were seasonal migrants and returned home for the harvest period.  See the Appendix for 
a summary of statistics on respondents. 
The mean salary was 28,800 CFA francs per month, or just under $140 PPP (Penn World 
15%
43%
4%
24%
3%
11%
Ethnic Groups of Population
Serere
Wolof
Diola
Pular
Mandinka
Other
61%
24%
7%
2% 1%
5%
Ethnic Groups of Migrants
Serere
Wolof
Diola
Pular
Mandinka
Other
Figure 4: Distribution of Ethnic Groups, Population Figure 5: Distribution of Ethnic Groups, Sample 
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Tables).  However, around one third reported also receiving room and board from their 
employer, and 51% said they received non-monetary benefits such as meals, gifts, or medical 
expenses.  Although it is questionable as a standard for living wage, the minimum wage in 
Senegal is 209 CFA francs (around $1 PPP) per hour, or 33,440 CFA francs per month based on 
a 40 hour work week (U.S. State Department). Thus, with additional benefits, domestic workers 
earn a wage on par with the minimum. On average, domestic workers sent 48.4% of their income 
to the head of the household in the community of origin.  Only three domestic workers remitted 
nothing, and three remitted 100% of their salaries.  This figure is on the high end of average 
remittance rates calculated in similar studies, but is not surprising considering the close 
relationship of domestic workers with their home regions, as demonstrated by return seasonal 
migration, and intentions to return. 
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6.0  METHODOLOGY 
The data was analyzed using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation.  Much of the remittance 
literature uses a standard Tobit regression model due to a high number of "0" observations.  
However, as only three 
participants in this study 
reported remitting 
nothing, and only two 
100% of their income, 
use of OLS was 
sufficient.  The 
dependent variable 
"percent of income 
remitted to parents or head of household" was regressed on potential explanatory variables based 
on information from the surveys.  Though many studies in the literature on remittances use the 
log of the amount remitted as the dependent variable, the percent of income remitted reveals 
information on the migrants’ willingness and ability to sacrifice a portion of their earnings.  In 
this case, the level of remittances and the percent of income remitted were also highly correlated 
(see Figure 6).  Salary was controlled for but not found to have a significant relationship with 
percent of income remitted.  
Figure 6: Relationship between Amount and Percent of Income Remitted 
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The following equation was estimated: 
Ŷ=β0+β1(age)+β2(age^2)+β3(children)+β4(children^2)+β5(age when starting work) +β6(1 if 
father deceased)+β7(1 if from Diourbel)+β8(1 if Seasonal Migrant)+β9(1 if autonomous in 
migration decision) 
Due to the general homogeneity of the domestic workers interview, there was concern 
that certain participants who seemed to stand out due to their old age, higher than average salary, 
or because they were divorced.  Following a strategy promoted by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 
(1980), the DFITS statistic was used to test if certain respondents were associated with high 
combinations of residuals and leverage statistics.  However, no participants were found to have a 
DFITS statistic over 2(k/n)^(1/2) where k is the number of explanatory variables and n is the 
number of observations under consideration.   
For age and number of children, observations are heavily concentrated on the smaller 
end, so heteroskedasticity was also a concern.  It is possible that this could lead to bias in the 
coefficients or prevent us from getting an accurate idea of the relationship between remittances 
and higher number of children.  However, the Breush-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test failed to reject 
the null hypothesis of constant variance at the .10 significance level, and a regression with robust 
t-statistics did not change the results enough to warrant inclusion. 
Although remittances are generally calculated using only data from migrant workers, six 
of the interviewed domestic workers were born in Dakar.  These participants did, however, 
report remitting (or transferring money) to the household of their parents, and were therefore 
included in the analysis. 
  23 
7.0  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Detailed charts characterizing the primary regression and the relationships individual explanatory 
variables with the percent of income remitted can be found in Tables 2 and 3 at the end of this 
section.  The following results have been established. Age is found to have a positive and 
statistically significant association with percent of income remitted initially, followed by a 
decrease in this effect for older respondents.  The turning point is at around 34 years of age.  This 
result holds both in the final regression isolating the relationship between percent of income 
remitted and age.   
 
Figure 7: Relationship between Age and Percent of Income Remitted 
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Please see Figure 7 for a linear and quadratic representation of the relationship between age and 
percent of income remitted. Evidently, the quadratic estimation is a much better fit than the 
linear equation. These findings are partially consistent with those of Dostie and 
Vencatachellum’s 2004 study on domestic workers, which found that the probability of 
observing voluntary remittances to increase with age, though the actual amount decreases.   
However, it is important to note that any relationship between the domestic worker’s age 
and her remitting behavior evidently interacts with the effect caused by the domestic worker's 
children.  The strong positive relationship between age and number of children can be seen in 
Figure 8. The relationship 
between remittances and 
number of children is 
concave, and more 
statistically significant 
than the age effect.  This 
can be seen in the 
graphical representation 
of Figure 9.  In fact, when 
only age and children are included in the regression, age is not statistically significant, though its 
relationship with percent of income remitted remains the same.  To see the interaction between 
age and children, consider that a 22 year old migrant is expected to remit about 2.5% more of her 
income than a 20 year old migrant, according to the coefficients in the primary regression.  
However, if that 22 year old migrant has once child, she is expected to remit almost 10% more of 
her income, holding everything besides age and children constant.  The effect of additional 
Figure 8: Relationship between Age and Number of Children 
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children is positive and maximized at two children, but decreases and eventually becomes 
negative after four children. See Figure 13 in the Appendix for information on the distribution of 
number of children in the sample.  
 
Figure 9: Relationship between Children and Percent of Income Remitted 
This initially positive relationship between number of children and remittances might be 
evidence for an exchange motivation for remitting.  That is, migrants with only one or two young 
children leave them in the care of their grandparents in order to be free to migrate for work.  The 
migrants then send additional remittances to cover the costs of caring for the child such as school 
supplies and clothing.  Regrettably, no data was collected on the location of the migrant’s 
children, which limits the confidence behind this hypothesis.  However, conversations with the 
migrant workers outside the context of the formal survey did suggest that leaving children at 
home was a common practice, so it is certainly a plausible explanation for the pattern observed 
in the data. This explanation also supports the exchange for services hypothesis first proposed 
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and supported by the research of Lucas and Stark in Botswana.  The negative relationship 
observed between remittances and number of children for migrants with a higher number of 
children can also be reconciled with this exchange hypothesis.  A higher number of children, 
most likely older, could indicate that the domestic worker is supporting her children and does not 
have as much money available to send to her parents.  However, only 9 of 102 respondents 
actually had 4 or more children, so it is unclear whether predictions in this range are likely to be 
representative of actual behavior.  Specifically, the results of the analysis are highly influenced 
by the three workers with seven children, who all remitted very little. To get a clearer picture of 
the relationship between 
children and remittances, 
I remove all respondents 
with four or more 
children.  The results of 
this analysis can be seen 
in Figure 10.   
The quadratic 
term becomes 
insignificant, but there is 
clearly still a positive 
linear relationship between children and remittances, which is significant at the .05 level. 
However, the overall importance of children also decreases; number of children explains only 
4.5% of the variation in percent of income remitted.  Given the limitations of the information 
collected in the sample, it would be worthwhile to devote further study to the relationship 
Figure 10: Relationship between Number of Children and % of Income 
Remitted with Potential Outliers Dropped 
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between remittances and the migrants’ children, as it appears to be a relevant factor. 
Another important factor in determining remittance rate was the whether or not the 
domestic worker's father was deceased.  Respondents whose fathers had died had an expected 
14.5 point decrease in their remittance rates.  This figure was also significant at the .01 level in 
the primary regression, and significant at the .05 level in a regression describing only the 
relationship between percent of income remitted and whether the domestic worker’s father had 
died.  This result is somewhat difficult to interpret without knowing specific data on the 
economic contributions of the domestic worker’s family members. If the father’s work was the 
family’s primary source of income, it is much less likely that the domestic worker's family would 
be able to support her in case of hard times.  In this case, the domestic workers’ behavior 
supports an insurance motive for remitting. It is also important to take into consideration that if 
the migrant’s father has died, there is one less person in the family to support, and therefore a 
decreased need for remittances. In this case, the migrants’ behavior supports an altruistic motive 
for remitting. However, this theory seems unlikely because there was no statistically significant 
relationship between percent of income remitted and the number of the migrants’ siblings. 
The original variable of interest, the domestic worker's status as a seasonal migrant, was 
also found to have a statistically significant impact on remittances.  Seasonal migrants were 
expected to remit almost 10% more than their non-seasonal counterparts.  This is logical as a 
domestic worker who spends three months of each year in her village will have a stake in the 
community and her family's financial solvency.  This is also consistent with the literature that 
has found that visits home and plans for return migration are correlated with higher remittances.  
One important characteristic to note about seasonal workers is that these migrants appear to be 
either very young or concentrated at the older end of the sample (see Figure 12 in the Appendix).  
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The preponderance of seasonal migrants in the 15-19 age range seems to be because seasonal 
migrants eventually decide to return home permanently, or stop participating in the harvest.  
Some of the non-seasonal migrants interviewed mentioned that they used to go home for the 
harvest, but had stopped and decided to live in Dakar permanently. 
Table 2: Regression Results 
 
The age at which a domestic worker started working was also positively correlated her 
remittances.  Respondents who didn't start work until later in life were likely to remit more, 
Determinants of Domestic Worker’s Remittances 
Dependent Variable: Percent of Income Remitted, Observations: 102 
 Children Only 
R2=.02, Adj R2=.01 
Age and Children only 
R2= .17, Adj. R2= .14 
Primary Equation 
R2= .35, Adj. R2= .29 
Explanatory Variable  Coefficient 
(T-Ratio) 
Coefficient 
(T-Ratio) 
Age  .02364 
(1.55) 
.03168** 
(2.13) 
Age Squared  -.00038 
(-1.53) 
-.00046** 
(-1.99) 
Total Number of 
Children 
-.02007 
(-1.50) 
.10187** 
(2.57) 
.09654** 
(2.53) 
Total Number of 
Children Squared 
 -.02235** 
(-3.49) 
-.02250*** 
(-3.78) 
1 if Father is Deceased   -.14499*** 
(-3.02) 
1 if Seasonal Migrant   .09604** 
(2.08) 
Age when respondent 
began work for pay 
  .00975** 
(2.18) 
1 if Domestic Worker 
Decided on her own to 
Migrate 
  -.11034** 
(-2.26) 
1 if from Diourbel   .09445** 
(2.02) 
Constant   -.040107 
(-0.20) 
***=significant at .01 level, **=significant at .05 level, *=significant at the .10 level “-“ denotes 
negative relationship between percent of income remitted and explanatory variable 
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likely because they were supported by their family for a longer period of time. In this case, it 
seems again as though the migrants were motivated by a desire to repay their family for benefits 
they have received.  Participants who reported making an autonomous decision to migrate for 
work were expected to remit less than those whose decision was made by a parent or elder.  This 
takes into account the "compulsory" aspect of remittances; it is probable that many domestic 
workers remit due to social pressure or orders from their parents.  Though this is a difficult 
condition to measure, the domestic worker’s response about whether her decision was 
autonomous gives us some insight. Finally, it was also found that domestic workers from the 
region of Diourbel were expected to remit about 9% more of their income than migrants from 
other regions.  One possible explanation for this pattern is that Touba, the headquarters of the 
Mouride brotherhood a Sufi order of Islam, is located in Diourbel.  The teachings of Mouridism 
emphasize hard work and devotion to the marabout (spiritual guide). Giving money for the poor 
to the marabout during the yearly pilgrimage to Touba, or near the festival of Tabaski (Eid al-
Adha), is expected, and said to bring good fortune (Flynn, 2007).  It is possible that Mourides 
from this region remit more in order to add to their family’s contributions to the marabout. 
Table 3: Individual Variable Regression Results 
 
Individual Variable Regressions on Percent of Income Remitted (Including Quadratic Terms) 
Dependent Variable: Percent of Income Remitted, Observations: 102 
Variable Age Age 
Squared 
Children Children 
Squared 
1  if father 
deceased 
1 if 
seasonal 
migrant 
Age 
startin
g work 
1 if 
decided to 
migrate 
1 if from 
Diourbel 
Coeffici
ent 
(T-stat) 
.03450** 
(2.20) 
-.0006** 
(-2.39) 
.11434*** 
(3.14) 
-.02459*** 
(-3.93) 
-.10563** 
(-2.10) 
.05794 
(1.09) 
.00724 
(1.64) 
-.08228 
(-1.51) 
.08969* 
(1.77) 
[R2, 
Adj. R2] 
[.06, .04]  [.15, .14]  [.04, .03] [.01, 
.00] 
[.03, 
.02] 
[.02, .01] [.03, .02] 
***=significant at .01 level, **=significant at .05 level, *=significant at the .10 level “-“ denotes 
negative relationship between percent of income remitted and explanatory variable 
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8.0  CONCLUSION 
Using data from an original survey of over 100 domestic workers living in Dakar, Senegal, this 
paper analyses the determinants of internal remittance and obtains three major results. First, 
status as a seasonal migrant is associated with a statistically significant increase of almost 10% 
of income remitted. Second, having a small number of children is associated with an initial 
increase in percent of income remitted, while having a higher number of children is correlated 
with lower remittances. Finally, migrants with a deceased father remit on average around 14.5% 
less of their monthly income to their remaining head of household than those with a living father.   
These findings lend important insights into our understanding of remitting behaviors, and 
could have policy implications.  The knowledge that seasonal household income fluctuation is 
often a motive for the temporary migration of young girls is important to the issue of early 
school drop-out rates. Though it is difficult to discourage this practice (indeed, many families 
rely on it), the development of a program facilitating seasonal migration which offers job 
placement and night classes could alleviate many of the issues associated with migration and 
domestic work.  This would not only help domestic workers to continue their education, but it 
would diminish some of the risk factors related to migration.  In addition, as having children 
residing in the home community seems to be a major motive for remittances, a fund for 
children’s issues could be created to pool these resources.  It could be used to supply school 
materials such as books and uniforms, or even to fund universal vaccinations for young children.   
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Though this study has revealed interesting and novel results, there are still plenty of 
questions remaining related to remittance behaviors. Future studies could ask participants 
directly about the purpose of their remittances.  Demonstrated characteristics and behaviors 
reveal the nature of motivations, but a direct question could reveal subtleties about each 
migrant’s situation.  For example, perhaps a migrant has a sick family member and remits to help 
pay for the cost of healthcare. Surprisingly, there is no data in any of the previous studies which 
addresses this issue.  The correlation between number of children and remittances should also be 
studied further in the context of internal migration.  As data on the location of the migrants’ 
children was unavailable for analysis in this study, it would be useful to obtain data which could 
confirm the hypothesis that young children often stay in the home community, and that 
remittances increase as a result.  A more extensive study with a larger sample would also help to 
clarify the behavior of migrants with many children, as they did not constitute a large portion of 
this sample.   Furthermore, an analysis of the remitting behaviors of male seasonal migrants 
could be insightful in showing whether this is a gender related phenomenon.  Overall, this study 
has made meaningful contributions to the literature on determinants of remittances, specifically 
in relation to the role of seasonal migration and number of children in remittance behavior. 
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APPENDIX A 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON SURVEY RESPONDENTS 
 
Figure 11: Age Distribution of Participants 
 
 
Figure 12: Age Distribution of Seasonal and Non-Seasonal Workers 
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Figure 13: Distribution of Number of Children among Migrants 
 
Figure 14: Frequency of Deceased Parents among Respondents 
 
Figure 15: Portion of Seasonal and Non-Seasonal Workers 
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Figure 16: Distribution of Ages that the Respondents Reported Beginning to Work for Wages 
 
Figure 17: Autonomy of Domestic Workers 
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Figure 18: Distribution of Geographical Origins of Respondents 
 
Figure 19: Living Situation of Respondents 
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Table 4: Additional Descriptive Statistics 
 
Additional Descriptive Statistics on Surveyed Population 
Mean Salary  28,800 CFA  
Mean Remittance Rate 48.5% of Salary 
Most Common Ethnicity  Sérère (60.7%)  
Mean Number of Siblings  5.3  
Percent of respondents whose parents are farmers  75.50%  
Percent of respondents whose parents are not working 20.60%  
Mean Tenure  15.6 months  
Median Tenure  5 months  
Mean number of years since migration to Dakar  7.5 years  
Rate of Domestic Workers making an autonomous decision to migrate 78.40%  
Literacy Rate  19.6%  
Median age when starting work  13 yrs old  
Marriage Rate 35.3% 
Respondents who are Seasonal Migrants 23.5% 
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APPENDIX B 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. Age: 
2. Gender: 
3. Neighborhood in Dakar: 
4. Marital Status: 
5. Children (Age, Gender): 
6. Literacy: Y/N 
7. What language(s) can you speak? 
8. What was your last completed level of formal education? 
9. Village/Region of Origin: 
10. Ethnic background: 
11. Parents (Age): 
12. Siblings (Age, Gender): 
13. How many of your siblings have migrated in search of work?  Do they send money to 
your parents or household? 
14. Do any family members live in Dakar? If so, what are their relationships to you? 
15. What is your parents’ primary occupation? 
16. Does your family engage in any other income generating activities outside of their 
primary occupation (ex: sale of vegetables, eggs, crafts)? 
17. Does your family own land? 
18. Do you or have you ever received financial assistance in the form of a loan from your 
family? 
19. How often do you return home to visit your family?  What is a typical duration of this 
visit? 
20. Do you return home during a specific time of the year in order to do agricultural work for 
your family? If so, during which months do you return home? 
21. Who made the decision for you to work in Dakar? 
22. At what age did you begin working for wages? 
23. How long have you lived in Dakar? 
24. How were you able to find your current household? 
25. How long have you worked for your current employer? 
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26. Do you live with your employer?  If not, with whom do you live? 
27. How much are you paid each month? 
28. Do you or your family receive non-monetary benefits from your employer (housing, 
meals, medical services, gifts, etc)? 
29. How much of your wages are sent directly from your employer to your family (monthly)? 
30. How much of your remaining wage do you voluntarily give to your family? 
31. Does the amount you send back to your family vary?  If so, what is the reason for the 
changes? 
32. Do you have any savings? 
33. Do you intend to stay in Dakar? If not, will you return to your family? 
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